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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
THEODIS WHITE, JR., 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 930696-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1993). 
TEXT OF STATUTE 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial judge commit reversible error in admitting 
the bloody clothing of the victim? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 403 determinations involve questions of law which are 
reviewed for correctness. The appellate court affords the trial 
judge "some discretion" in determining whether the evidence should 
have been admitted and reverses the trial court's decision where the 
trial court "acted unreasonably in striking the balance" under 
Rule 403. Ramirez, 817 P **d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991). 
In Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3, the Court stated: 
. . . [0]n occasion, the legal standard for 
admissibility of evidence vests a measure of 
discretion in the trial court. For example, Utah 
Rule of Evidence 403 requir s that a trial court 
balance the probativeness oi a piece of evidence 
against its potential for unfair prejudice; if 
the potential for unfair prejudice outweighs the 
probativeness, the evidence is excluded as a 
matter of law. Utah R. Evid. 403. The trial 
court initially performs that balancing. If it 
concludes that the evidence is admissible, we 
review that decision for correctness. But in 
deciding whether the trial court erred as a 
matter of lawf we de facto grant it some 
discretion, because we reverse only if we 
conclude that it acted unreasonably in striking 
the balance. [citations omitted] 
(emphasis added)• 
A review of Rule 403 case law demonstrates that in the 
past, the Utah Supreme Court has afforded trial courts "some 
discretion" which is neither "broad discretion" nor "de novo" 
review. See, e.g., State v. Maurerf 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989) 
(discussing interpretation given Rule 403 by various courts and 
reversing trial judge's ruling admitting letter written by defendant 
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to victim's father); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 1201; State v. 
Cloud, 722 P.2d 750f 752-3 (Utah 1986). 
Following the Ramirez decision, the Supreme Court stated: 
"[I]n reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence under rule 403, we will not overturn the court's 
determination unless it was an 'abuse of discretion.'" State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239 (Utah 1992) citing Szate v. Verde, 770 
P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 1989). However, in State v. Pena, 232 Utah Adv. 
Rep. *> (Utah 1994), the Court recognized that "the term 'abuse of 
discretion' has no tight meaning." See also Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991) (recognizing 
that trial judge abuses his or her discretion where conclusion of 
law is incorrect and where a finding of fact is clearly erroneous). 
Rule 403 rulings involve the "application of legal 
propositions to facts" and therefore fall into the "third category" 
of standards of review discussed in Pena. S^e State v. Pena, 232 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 5. The standard of review applicable to a trial 
court's determination of whether the facts are such that the 
evidence should not be admitted pursuant to Rule 403 is therefore a 
question "of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness, 
1. Prior to the decisions in Verde and Hamilton, the Supreme Court 
articulated a "clearly erroneous" standard of feview in some 
Rule 403 cases. See, e.g., State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 
1989); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1141 (U *h 1989); but see 
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d at 752-3 (applying abu^e of discretion 
standard). The subsequent opinions in Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3, 
and Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5-6, clarify that Rule 403 
determinations involve questions of law which are decided after 
granting "some discretion" to the trial judge. 
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as opposed to being a fact determination reviewable for clear 
error. [footnote omitted]." Pena, 232 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5-6; see 
also State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. In applying the law to 
the facts, however, "some" discretion is given to the trial judge. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 n.3. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
In an Information dated June 3, 1993, the State charged 
Defendant/Appellant Theodis White, Jr. with one count of Attempted 
Criminal Homicide, Murder, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1953 as amended). R. 6. 
On July 19, 1993, Appellant filed a Notice of Intent to 
Rely on Defense of Diminished Capacity. R. 18. Thereafter, the 
trial judge ordered the appointment of two examiners and ordered 
that their reports be filed by August 19, 1993. R. 62. 
On September 23 and 24, 1993, the case was tried to a 
jury. R. 123. The jury convicted Mr. White of Attempted Criminal 
Homicide as charged in the Information. R. 173. 
On October 18, 1993, the trial judge imposed sentence and 
entered judgment. R. 178. On November 2, 1993, Defendant/Appellant 
filed his Notice of Appeal. R. 180. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 23, 1993, at about 1:00 to 1:30 a.m., Kevin "Jake" 
Barney, David "Todd" Egleston and Paul Keenan were driving eastbound 
on 800 South in Salt Lake City. R. 254. The trio had been at 
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Todd#s house, then had driven somewhere to play video games, and 
later were just driving around with the stereo cranked up. R. 273, 
277. 
The trio had been drinking whiskey during the two or three 
hours before the incident in this case. R. 275. They came to a 
light at 300 East and 800 South and saw a brown Celica with three 
people inside. R. 255-6. Defendant/Appellant Theodis White 
("Theo") was a passenger in the Celica. R. 257. 
Occupants of the two vehicles began yelling back and for* 
then Todd, the driver of the first car, "flipped off" the occupants 
of the Celica. R. 257.2 Todd testified that he "flipped off" the 
occupants of the other car 
because they said something, they were yelling 
something. And the driver was like leaning 
forward and gesturing at himself like if I wanted 
to fight or something. And at that point I think 
that we were going to fight and we were going to 
pull over and we told them that ... . 
R. 257-8. 
At that point, Theo "was hanging out the window waving a 
knife and Paul said 'he has a gun7 and he was tripping out and 
screaming." R. 258, 314. Theo screamed at the occupants of the 
other car so loudly that they could hear him as they drove at about 
45m.p.h. R. 281. As the two cars drove along, Theo apparently 
yelled many times that the occupants of the first car were "going to 
2. David Egleston testified that when he said that he "flipped 'em 
off" he meant that he "flipped the bird. Gave 'em the middle 
finger," and that extending his middle finger toward others was 
another way of saying "F off." R. 257, 280. 
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die" or words to that effect. R. 292, 306. Theo appeared to be 
"uncontrollably angry." R. 306. 
Todd testified that he attempted to drive away from the 
Celica, but the Celica followed. Todd drove down a road near 
Liberty Park which turned out to be a dead end. R. 264. Todd 
turned the car around and thought he could get past the Celica 
without hitting it. R. 283. Instead, he made contact wi .1 the 
Celica and damaged his car as he drove out of the dead end. R. 265, 
283. The collision between the two vehicles upset the occupants of 
the Celica. R. 380. 
The three drove back to 700 East, then down to about 
3300 East where they pulled off into a neighborhood near Granite 
High and stopped to inspect the damage to the car. R. 266. After 
they were out of the car, the brown Celica arrived. Theo jumped out 
of the Celica while it was still moving. R. 292, 303. When the 
Celica stopped, Todd ran to a nearby 7-Eleven. R. 270. The driver 
of the Celica hit Paul under the eye, then Paul ran to the 
7-Eleven. R. 294. Jake jumped into Todd's car, then Theo stabbed 
him eight times with a knife. R. 294, 329. Exhibits 9 through 12 
depict Jake's wounds. R. 330, 334. While Theo was stabbing, Jake 
was kicking and holding up his hands. R. 334. Theo repeated things 
like "this is what you deserve" and "take this" as he stabbed Jake. 
R. 335. 
Jake grabbed Theo's wrist and pushed him away, then opened 
the car door and pushed the other fellow away and started running. 
R. 336. Jake arrived at the 7-Eleven two or three minutes after 
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Todd and Paul. R. 272. He was walking and running, and he was 
bleeding. R. 272. 
Dr. R. Dirk Noyes, a surgeon at L.D.S. Hospital, described 
the wounds for the jury. R. 369-75. The most serious wound was in 
the stomach area where the stabbing had perforated the stomach, 
causing bleeding and the leakage of stomach juices. R. 372-374. 
Theo was arrested several days after the incident. R. 6-7, 
378-9. After being advised of his Miranda rights, Theo made a 
statement regarding the incident to Detective Judd. R. 378-9. 
During the course of that statement, Theo discussed the fact that he 
has epilepsy and is supposed to take Dilantin but had not been 
taking it because it made him sick. R. 388. 
Twila Lu Jan, Theo's girlfriend at the time of the incident 
and an occupant of the Celica, testified that she thought Theo was 
supposed to take Lithium and and that he was acting "kind of funny" 
on the night of the incident and told her he had taken "acid." 
R. 402. Dr. Golding testified that Theo told him he took two or 
three "hits" of acid or L.S.D. and consumed a fair amount of alcohol 
on the night of the incident. R. 429. 
The defense introduced psychological testimony from 
Dr. Golding, a forensic psychologist who had been appointed by the 
court to do an evaluation of Theo, regarding Theo's diminished 
mental capacities. R. 415-92. Dr. Golding testified that he found 
three areas that affected Theo's ability to function: (1) Theo hart 
been a victim of sexual abuse by a close relative for an extended 
period of time, (2) Theo was physically abused by his father who 
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engaged in substantial amounts of violence and eventually spent time 
in prison as the result of violent conduct, and (3) Theo experienced 
a "chaotic upbringing" which included witnessing large amounts of 
violence and having a chaotic relationship with the adults who were 
raising him. R. 418-9. 
Theo grew up seeing random and chaotic violence. R. 420. 
His father was a violent alcoholic who did things such as sitting 
the children down and telling them that life was not worth living 
and that they were to watch him die, then ingesting pills. R. 420. 
Theo's father also pulled out guns and ultimately went to prison for 
the murder of his girlfriend's cousin and the attempted murder of 
his girlfriend. R. 422. Theo and his sister witnessed the killing 
and attempted homicide of their father's girlfriend who was their 
"functional step-mother." R. 428. Theo had seen or talked to his 
mother only once or twice in a number of years. R. 422. 
Theo recalls going into a rage on the night of the 
incident. R. 430. Dr. Golding testified that Theo had an explosive 
response to the incident, and characterized this as "almost a random 
response." R. 431. 
Dr. Golding testified that Theo's mental capacities were 
diminished by the events he had experienced during his childhood. 
R. 444. Physical and verbal confrontations worked as "trigger 
mechanisms" which led to rages over which Theo had ver little 
control. R. 465. Alcohol consumption and drugs such as L.S.D. 
exac vted the condition. R. 465. Dr. Golding opined that at the 
time of the stabbing, Theo's "capacities were diminished" due to 
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alcohol and drugs along with his personality structure based on his 
background and his susceptibility to trigger mechanisms, and that he 
was, "in colloquial terms," in a "blind rage with the associated 
diminishment of capacities." R. 467. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Admission of the blood covered pants and shirt worn by Jake 
Barney at the time of the incident requires a new trial. The white 
pants and blue and tfhite striped shirt containing large amounts of 
blood were gruesome, highly prejudicial pieces of evidence. The 
clothing had no pr ative value. The location and description of 
the wounds was established by the testimony of the emergency room 
doctor, Jake Barney and Jake's friends. The shirt and pants added 
no information and presented less precise information about the 
wounds than the testimony listed above. Because the clothing had no 
probative value but was highly prejudicial, it was inadmissible 
under Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. The error requires a new 
trial given the extensive testimony demonstrating a diminished 
capacity to form intent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN ADMITTING THE VICTIMS BLOODY CLOTHING. 
Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel objected 
to the anticipate introc ction by the State of the victim's bloody 
clothing on the grounds - at the bloody clothing was more 
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prejudicial than probative and therefore inadmissible under 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. R. 309. The trial judge 
overruled the objection. R. 311-12. See Addendum A for transcript 
of argument and ruling. Defense counsel renewed her objection when 
the State introduced the evidence. R. 332. The trial judge again 
overruled the objection. R. 332. 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on 
grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, 
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence. 
Rule 403 requires that the court balance the probative 
value of the disputed evidence against its potential prejudicial 
effect. Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1141. 
"The probative value of the evidence is judged by the 
'strength of the evidence and its ability to make the existence of a 
consequential fact either more or less probable [footnote omitted]' 
and 'the proponent's need for the evidence.'" Johnson, 784 P.2d at 
1140. 
Relevance is determined according to whether the evidence 
will assist the trier of fact in understanding the nature of the 
crime or the manner in which the crime was committed. State v. 
Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985). 
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence provides that "[e]vidence 
is relevant if it has 'any tendency to make the existence of any 
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fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.'" 
State v, Maurer, 770 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1989). Evidence which i • 
merely cumulative of c evidence or which can "readily be 
F /ided to the jury by less potentially prejudicial means" is of 
minimal, if any, relevance. State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
1986) (prejudicial photographs inadmissible unless proponent 
establishes they convey relevant evidence which is not otherwise 
available to jury); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1257 (Utah 
1985) (an important consideration in establishing probative value is 
whether evidence can be established by other means); State v. Poe, 
44 P.2d 512 (Utah 1968) (photographs which conveyed only 
information which had already been introduced through testimony were 
inadmissible); State v. Wellsf 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979) (photographs 
"superfluous" where they conveyed informf r*n contained in medical 
examiner's testimony). 
Evidence which has some probative value is nevertheless 
inadmissible under Rule 403 where the prejudicial effect of such 
evidence outweighs its probative value. Circumstances which require 
exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence are those which "'entail 
risks which range all the way from inducing decision on a purely 
emotional basis, at one extreme, to nothing more harmful than 
wasting time, at the other extreme.'" Maurer, 770 P.2d at 984, 
quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note, quoted in 
M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 403.1 at 178 (2d ed. 1986). 
"'Unfair prejudice' within [Rule 403's] context 
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an 
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improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, 
an emotional one," [citation omitted] "In 
reaching a decision to exclude on grounds of 
unfair prejudice . . • [t]he availability of 
other means of proof may also be an appropriate 
factor." [citation omitted]. 
Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has "recognized that inherent in 
certain categories of relevant evidence is an unusually strong 
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury" and 
that such evidence "is uniquely subject to being used to distort the 
deliberative process and improperly skew the outcome." State v. 
Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1256 (Utah 1988). Evidence which falls in 
such categories will be excluced under Rule 403 unless the proponent 
of the evia ce can establish that it is "unusually probative." Id. 
While the Utah Supreme Court has not expressly recognized 
that a victim's bloody clothing can be as gruesome as photographs 
and carry the same propensity for prejudice and distortion as 
gruesome photographs, other courts have recognized the potential for 
prejudice inherent in this type of evidence. See, e.g., State v. 
Steele, 586 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1978) ("The admission of gruesome 
objects such as photographs, clothing and weapons, when introduced 
for no other purpose than to inflame and arouse the passions of the 
jury, can lead to a conviction resulting from the jury/s revulsion 
and not from the State's proving the elements of the crime."); see 
also Jennings v. State, 506 £*2d 931, 935 (Okl. Crim. App. 1973) 
(recognizing that victim's bloody clothing is admissible only where 
necessary to clarify a relevant fact, and not where "its only effect 
- 12 -
would be to arouse passion and prejudice in the minds of the jury11) . 
In State v. Johns , 784 P.2d at 1141, the defendant 
claimed that introduction of the trooper's bloodstained uniform was 
error under Rule 403. The Court pointed out that "[a] brown shirt 
with dried blood on it does not equate with the evidence we have 
previously deemed highly prejudicial." Id. Nevertheless, the Court 
recognized that "admission of the trooper's uniform may have created 
some danger of prejudice." Id. The Court's resolution of the 403 
claim in Johnson is based in part on its recognition that the br- n 
shirt and similarly colored blood did not create the gruesome type 
of evidence it was referring to in Lafferty. In other words, 
because the blood was barely visible on the trooper's uniform, the 
evidence was not as gruesome as the photographs in Cloud. 
By contrast, ir: the present case, the evidence at issue 
consists of a navy blue and white shirt and white pants. Large 
blood stains are evident on both pieces of clothing. The contrast 
between the white pants and white stripes leaves no questions as to 
the contour of the blood stains or the large amount of blood on the 
clothing. This evidence has the same potential for prejudice 
- nherent in gruesome photographs. 
Appellate courts in this state have reversed 403 rulings 
regardless of whether the admitted evidence fit into the special 
categories outlined in Lafferty. See, e.g., State v. Maurer, 770 
P.2d 981 (Utah 1989) (holding that admission of the entire contents 
of a letter written by the defendant to the decedent's father was 
reversible error under Rule 403). 
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In the present case, the clothing worn by "Jake" Barney had 
little, if any, probative value. As was the case in Johnson, 784 
P.2d at 1141, other pieces of evidence were "better resources for 
determining the magnitude of injury" than the bloodstained 
clothing. Paul Keenan testified briefly about the extent of Jake's 
injuries (R. 295), "Jake" Barney testified about his wounds (R. 334, 
336-7), and Dr. Noyes described the wounds (R. 369-74). In 
addition, the State introduced photographs of the wounds as State's 
exhibits 11-S, 10-S, 9-S, and 12-S. R. 330. 
Furthermore, rather than simply introducing the clothing, 
the prosecutor focused on the pants and shirt, asking the witness to 
indicate "where on the shirt [he was] stabbed" and where on the 
pants he was stabbed. R. 333-4. The clothing had apparently been 
cut after the incident as evidenced by Jake's uncertainty as to 
whether a cut in the shirt was from the stabbing or made for some 
other purpose. R. 333. He stated: 
KEVIN JACOB BARNEY: Well, they had to cut it 
right down the middle so it was this, actually 
looks like this is the, might be the stab wound 
right here where it stabbed through my shirt and 
right here is another hole. You can't really 
tell anything 'cause they are short sleeves. 
There is another hole up here in the left sleeve. 
R. 333. 
Because the clothing had no "tendency to make the existence 
of any fact ... more probable or less probable," it had no 
relevance. In addition, the existence of other, more direct 
evidence of the wounds made this evidence unnecessary and irrelevant. 
- 14 -
Balanced against the lack of relevance is the overwhelming 
prejudicial effect of this idence. The Court recognized in 
Johnson that even where the blood stains were barely visible against 
the brown trooper's uniform, admission of the clothing "may have 
created some danger of prejudice." Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1141. In 
this case, where large quantities of blood are strikingly evident 
against white clothing, the prejudi "al effect of the evidence 
substantially outweighs any probative value. 
The error in admitting the bloody clothing requires a new 
trial. An error is harmful "when a reasonable likelihood exists 
that absent the error, the result would have been more favorable to 
the defendant. [citations omitted]." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 
1221, 1230 (Utah 1989). The "reasonable likelihood" test is met 
where an appellate court's "confidence in the outcome is 
undermined." Dibello, 780 P.2d at 1230, citing State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987). 
In this case, Theo presented significant evidence 
demonstrating that he had a diminished mental capacity or otherwise 
was unable to form the requisite intent. Jake and the occupants of 
the car in which Jake was riding described Theo as "tripping out and 
screaming" and uncontrollably angry . R. 258, 306, 314. Theo was 
also described as acting "kind of funny" on the night of the 
incident. R. 402. Evidence was presented that Theo suffered from 
epilepsy but had ;iot been regularly taking the prescribed Dilantin, 
had also not been taking Lithium as required, and had taken two h 3 
of L.S.D. on the night of the incident in addition to consuming a 
- 15 -
fair amount of alcohol. R. 388, 402, 429. 
The defense also introduced the testimony of Dr. Golding, a 
forensic psychologist who had been appointed to evaluate Theo. 
R. 416. Dr. Golding testified that three areas impacted on Theo's 
ability to function and diminished his mental capacities: (1) Theo 
was a victim of sexual abuse by a close relative for an extend<~i 
period of time, (2) Theo's father engaged in substantial amounts of 
violence and physically abused Theo, and (3) Theo experienced a 
"chaotic upbringing" which included witnessing large amounts of 
violence, including a homicide perpetrated by his father, and had a 
chaotic relationship with the adults who raised him. R. 415-19, 
444. Dr. Golding opined that at the time of the incident, Theo's 
"capacities were diminished" by drugs, alcohol and a personality 
structure based on his background that caused him to go into a blind 
rage in response to certain "trigger mechanisms." R. 465-7. 
Considering Dr. Golding's testimony combined with the 
evidence which suggested that Theo was out of control or acted in a 
blind rage, a reasonable likelihood exists that had the prejudicial 
clothing not been admitted, the jury would not have convicted Theo. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Theodis White, Jr. respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand the case 
for a new trial. 
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SUBMITTED this 9tt day of March, 1994. 
<r^LCu^m 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this 9"fe day of March, 1994. 
<JklC<)ZY 
JOAN C. WATT 
1 DELIVERED this f day of March, 1994. 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
ASK THAT YOU RETURN AT 1:30 SO THAT WE CAN START PROMPTLY 
AT THAT TIME. 
(RECESS). 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE RECORD MAY SHOW WE ARE CON-
VENED IN THE STATE VERSUS THEODIS WHITE CASE OUTSIDE THE 
PRESENCE OF THE JURY AT THE REQUEST OF COUNSEL TO DEAL 
WITH A COUPLE OF LEGAL MATTERS. 
MS. REMAL: THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR. 
MR. BLAYLOCK: YOUR HONOR, PERHAPS IT WOULD BE 
BEST IF I STARTED. I INDICATED TO THE COURT THAT BRENDA 
12 CARAKER WAS A WITNESS THAT I INTENDED TO CALL. 
13 JUDGE YOUNG: THE NAME AGAIN? 
14 MR. BLAYLOCK: BRENDA, C-A-R-A-K-E-R, CARAKER. 
15 SHE IS AN INDIVIDUAL WHO WAS KNOWN TO DEFENSE COUNSEL. A 
16 COPY OF THE REPORT WAS MADE AVAILABLE TO DEFENSE COUNSEL. 
17 SHE IS A PERSON WHO AT ABOUT 11:10 THAT EVENING WAS CON-
18 FRONTED BY MR. WHITE WITH A KNIFE. I INDICATED THAT I 
19 INTENDED TO CALL HER BUT HAD NEGLECTED TO MENTION HER NAME 
20 TO THE JURY. AND REQUEST THE RULING OF THE COURT WITH 
21 REGARDS TO WHETHER OR NOT SHE'D BE AVAILABLE. 
22 MS. REMAL: AND YOUR HONOR, I INDICATED THAT I'M 
23 NOT SURPRISED BY HER. I CERTAINLY AM AWARE OF HER, OF 
24 THIS, BEFORE. MY CONCERN, FIRST OF ALL, IS AS TO THE 
25 I RELEVANCE OF HER TESTIMONY. AND AS MR. BLAYLOCK POINTED 
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OUT, THE TESTIMONY OF THE EVENT IS THAT SHE WAS APPARENTLY 
PREPARED TO DESCRIBE WHAT HAPPENED A COUPLE OF HOURS PRIOR 
TO THE EVENT IN QUESTION HERE. AND BASED ON THAT IT'S MY 
POSITION THAT HER TESTIMONY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE CASE. 
SECONDLY, EVEN IF THE COURT DECIDES THAT SHE IS 
RELEVANT I WOULD SIMPLY REQUEST THAT WE QUESTION THE 
TJRORS WHO WERE SELECTED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY KNOW 
ER OR ARE FAMILIAR WITH HER SINCE THAT WASN'T DONE PREVI-
USLY BECAUSE MR." BLAYLOCK FORGOT TO MENTION HER NAME. 
THERE WAS A SECOND ISSUE THAT WE DISCUSSED AND 
SAT IS REGARDING THE BLOODY PANTS AND SHIRT OF MR. 
\RNEY'S THAT MR. BLAYLOCK INTENDS TO INTRODUCE TO THE 
)URT, IN THE CASE BEFORE THE JURY. IT IS MY ARGUMENT 
[AT THAT CLOTHING, THOSE TWO EXHIBITS, THE SHIRT AND THE 
NTS, WHICH, AS YOU WILL SEE WHEN YOU SEE THEM, ARE QUITE 
OODY. THAT THEY ARE EACH MORE PREJUDICIAL THAN PROBA-
TE AND UNDER RULE 403 OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE I WOULD 
iC THE COURT TO EXCLUDE THAT. 
MY REASON FOR SAYING THAT IS, NO. 1, BECAUSE OF 
! APPEARANCE OF THE CLOTHING THEMSELVES, IT IS QUITE 
IODY, I BELIEVE THAT THEY'RE INFLAMMATORY BUT, SECONDLY, 
RE CERTAINLY IS OTHER EVIDENCE THAT MAKES, THAT PRES-
S THE SAME FACTS TO THE JURY. THE OTHER EVIDENCE I 
ECT, AT LEAST, WILL BE THE TESTIMONY OF KEVIN BARNEY 
WILL TESTIFY ABOUT WHAT WOUNDS AND HOW MANY WOUNDS HE 
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1 RECEIVED. THERE HAS BEEN ALREADY THE TESTIMONY OF MR. 
2 KEENAN AND MR. EGLESTON ABOUT THE BLOOD THAT THEY OE. VED 
3 WHEN MR. BARNEY CAME OVER TO THEM AT THE 7-ELEVEN. 
4 AND APPARENTLY DR. NOYES, WHO IS THE DOCTOR WHO 
5 TREATED MR. BARNEY, IS GOING TO TESTIFY. CERTAINLY, HE IS 
6 GOING TO BE ABLE TO TESTIFY AS TO THE LOCATION OF THE 
7 WOUNDS, THE AMOUNT OF BLOOD THAT WAS LOST, THE PHYSICAL 
8 AFFECT OF THOSE WOUNDS ON MR. BARNEY. 
9 IT APPEARS TO ME THAT ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE FACT 
10 THAT THERE WERE OTHER SOURCES OF THE INFORMATION ABOUT THE 
11 LOCATION OF THE WOUNDS, AND EVERYTHING ABOUT THE WOUNDS, 
12 THAT ADMITTING THE BLOODY CLOTHING ON TOP OF THAT OTHER 
13 EVIDENCE IS CERTAINLY MORE BENEFICIAL THAN PROBATIVE. I 
14 MENTIONED TO THE COURT THAT ALTHOUGH THESE CERTAINLY 
15 AREN'T PHOTOGRAPHS, THEY ARE PHYSICAL EXHIBITS, THE 
16 CLOTHING. I THINK ANALOGOUS REASONING SHOULD BE USED IS 
17 THAT THAT IS USED IN CASES SUCH AS STATE V. CLOUD. WHICH 
18 IS A UTAH SUPREME COURT CASE DEALING WITH PHOTOGRAPHS OF 
19 THE LLOODY SCENE. ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY I RECOGNIZE THERE IS 
20 A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHOTOGRAPHS AND CLOTHING I THINK THE 
21 SAME REASONING APPLIES AND, THAT IS, THE COURT NEEDS TO 
22 BALANCE THE PROBATIVE VALUE AGAINST THE PREJUDICIAL VALUE 
23 IN ALSO DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE OTHER LFSS 
24 PREJUDICIAL AND LESS INFLAMMATORY SOURCES FOR THE SAME 
25 INFORMATION. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. LET ME 
STATE THAT IN RELATION TO THE TESTIMONY OF BRENDA CARAKER 
MY FEELING AT THIS POINT IS THAT I WILL NOT ALLOW HER TO 
TESTIFY BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT THE INCIDENT WAS TWO 
HOURS EARLIER, IT WAS UNRELATED IN TIME AND PLACE, AND THE 
ONLY THING IS IT'S CO INCIDENTALLY CLOSE IN TIMING AND IT 
WOULD BE INFLAMMATORY. SO I WILL NOT ALLOW THAT TESTIMONY 
IN UNLESS I DETERMINE THAT IT SHOULD BE RELEVANT ON REBUT-
TAL AFTER THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY OR OTHER TESTIMONY IN 
RELATION TO HIS STATS OF MIND. AND IF IT BECOMES RELEVANT 
THROUGH THE EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTOR THAT HE COULD HAVE 
BEEN IN THIS STATE OF MIND FOR A PERIOD OF TIME THEN IT 
MAY BE RELEVANT TO HIS STATE OF MIND. SO THE DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTION WOULD BE GRANTED IN TERMS OF NOT ALLOWING HER TO 
TESTIFY IN THE DIREC"' PORTION OF THE STATE'S CASE. 
IN RELATIC 0 THE CLOTHING OF MR. BARNEY THE 
COURT FINDS THAT THAT'S PART OF THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF 
THE CASE. AND THIS IS A CASE WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS 
ACCUSED OF ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, OR MURDER, AND 
THAT'S IN VIOLATION, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, OF 76-5-203. AND 
THE NATURE OF THE AGGRESSION IS, IN PART, ILLUSTRATED BY 
THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE CLOTHING, AND THE BLEEDING 
THAT MAY BE SHOWN ON IT--AND I HAVEN'T SEEN THE CLOTHING 
YET--IS THE RESULT, ALLEGED RESULT OF THE CONDUCT OF THE 
DEFENDANT IN RELATION TO THE CLOTHING, THEREFORE, THE 
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I^rvr FINDS THAT IT'S PART OF THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE OF THE 
,-ei AND APPROPRIATELY ADMISSIBLE AND NOT DESIGNED TO 
-fPUtfE TEfc. • l t.'l'' nil', £«ACTUA.JI BASIS. 
«3 IBB CLOTHING WILL BE ADMISSIBLE AND MRS. CARAKER'S 
pprrv WILL NOT BE ALLOWED WITHOUT FUF'- ' •; 
CX*T-
K. MR. BLAYLOC* »-Nh » HONOR. 
MS. REMAL ' " ~ ~ 
g JUDGE YC_I\ ; WILL L«.jLi«w THE JURY I N . 
(WHEREUPON, THE "URY RETURNS TO THE COURTROOM). 
JUDGE YOT7N- *•-• ~<T,A . |' WITNESS. ' 
i i ^ T L G C K : THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MR. 
trr/EN BROPHY. 
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